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Abstract
We develop a theoretical analysis of two widely used regulations of genetic
tests, Disclosure Duty and Consent Law, and we run an experiment in order
to shed light on both the take-up rate of genetic testing and on the com-
parison of policyholders’ welfare under the two regulations. Disclosure duty
forces individuals to reveal their test results to insurers, exposing them to a
discrimination risk. Consent law allows them to hide any detrimental infor-
mation, resulting in adverse selection. The experiment results in much lower
genetic tests take-up rates with Disclosure Duty than with Consent Law,
showing that subjects are very sensitive to the discrimination risk. Under
Consent Law, take-up rates increase with the adverse selection intensity. A
decrease in the test cost, and in adverse selection intensity, both make it
more likely that Consent Law is preferred to Disclosure Duty.
Keywords: Consent Law, Disclosure Duty, Personalized Medicine, Test
take-up rate, pooling health insurance contracts.
JEL Codes: C91, D82, I18.
1 Introduction
Health insurance regulation faces the following trade-off. Allow insurers to
adjust the contracts offered to policyholders according to their individual
health status, and individuals face a discrimination risk (or, in its dynamic
version, a reclassification risk). Restrict the ability of insurers to price their
contracts according to all relevant individuals’ characteristics, and some ad-
verse selection may emerge.
Our objective in this article is to study this trade-off in the context of
the emergence of personalized medicine, defined as the use of an individ-
ual’s genetic profile to guide prevention, diagnosis, or treatment decisions.
The advent of ever cheaper and more informative genetic tests will drive the
development of personalized medicine. These tests will allow individuals to
obtain very detailed information on their genetic predisposition to several
diseases, as well as on potential prevention strategies to decrease the prob-
ability of the disease occurring, and on the treatment to be followed if the
disease occurs.1 With increasing medical benefits of testing, coupled with
lower monetary costs, the prevalence of genetic testing will most probably
increase in the foreseeable future.
In such a context, it becomes necessary to better understand how this
genetic information should be regulated, and whether current regulations
should be modified as the prevalence of genetic testing increases. More pre-
cisely, it is likely that in the next decades genetic testing will affect the trade-
off between adverse selection and discrimination risk in two ways. First, these
tests may convey more precise information on individuals’ health risks. When
tested agents are forced by law to reveal to insurers their genetic informa-
tion, they then face a stronger discrimination risk. Second, in most countries
1See Abrahams and Silver (2010) for a history of personalized medicine and also
Anaya et al. (2016) for applications to autoimmune diseases. It is fair to say that,
while the cost of sequencing a whole genome has decreased at a very impressive rate (see
http://www.genome.gov/sequencingcosts, last accessed on October 26, 2018) and is likely
to continue to do so, the amount of actionable health information gleaned from sequencing
has not grown at the same pace. For instance, while knowing one’s genome can bring more
precise information as to the likelihood of developing a disease in the future, it does not
always give much useful guidance for prevention. This is recognized by Snyder (2016),
among others. The difficulty lies in the fact that genetic diseases are complex and affected
by the environment. This being said, Snyder (2016) contains many examples where genetic
testing already has medical value and claims that this will be the case even more in the
not too distant future.
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individuals decide whether they want to take a genetic test or not. This
decision to acquire information then depends on whether this information
has to be shared with insurers or not. If disclosure is mandatory, the ensuing
discrimination risk may reduce incentives to take the test in the first place
(Hirshleifer, 1971), resulting in the loss of precious health information. If
disclosure is not mandatory, individuals may hide any bad information they
have discovered, resulting in a stronger version of adverse selection than if
they were uninformed of their genetic background. This last effect will likely
increase as genetic testing becomes more widely used.
Regulations of the health information generated by genetic testing vary a
lot across countries, as described by Otlowski, Taylor and Bombard (2012).
While regulations labelled “Laissez-Faire” and “Disclosure Duty” mandate
disclosure of genetic information to health insurers,2 “Consent Law” and
“Strict Prohibition” allow withholding of information.3 The latter type of
regulation generates adverse selection while the former type aims at avoiding
this adverse selection but creates a discrimination risk. Moreover, the two
types of regulation produce different incentives to take a genetic test.
In this article, we compare Consent Law and Disclosure Duty, as these
two regulations best exemplify the trade-off between adverse selection and
discrimination risk in a setting where individuals are left to decide whether
to take a genetic test or not. We first develop a theoretical framework to
compare those regulations, and we then devise an experiment to elicit which
regulation individuals would selfishly prefer, and whether they would take a
genetic test under each regulation. Moreover, we are interested in how pref-
erences for testing and for regulations will evolve as testing costs decrease.
An experimental setting is a natural first step to understand behavior and
preferences with respect to both regulations, and how they change with test-
2Laissez-Faire allows the health insurers to require testing from their customers, while
Disclosure Duty does not. Laissez-Faire is applied in China, Japan, Korea, New Zealand,
Russia, Singapore, Spain, and South Africa whereas Disclosure Duty is the regulatory
regime in the UK.
3Under Consent Law, agents choose whether they want to disclose genetic information,
which can be used in their contracting with health insurers, while under Strict Prohibition
no contract can be explicitly based on genetic information – which does not prevent insurers
from offering menus of contracts that indirectly elicit information on individual risks.
Australia, the Netherlands, and Switzerland are three of the countries applying a Consent
Law regime whereas Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, France, Germany (except for
life insurances with significant premiums), Ireland, Israel, Italy, Norway, and Portugal
apply a Strict Prohibition regime.
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ing costs. Observe that, to obtain answers to those questions with empirical
data, we would have to find a (quasi-)natural experiment where the regula-
tion has changed at some point in time, and with discontinuities in genetic
testing costs across groups. This is very unlikely because these regulations
have been introduced quite recently in most countries, and have thus varied
very little since their inception.4
Our theoretical set-up is as follows.5 Agents can be of two types depend-
ing on their genetic background: type L have a low probability of developing
a disease while type H have a high probability. Agents are uninformed about
their type, unless they take a genetic test which reveals their type without
error, and allows them to better tailor a prevention effort (i.e., tests have
medical value).6 Genetic tests are costly to individuals, because of their
monetary cost but also because some agents may dislike knowing with preci-
sion their genetic background. Agents are then heterogeneous in their testing
cost. After deciding to test or not, individuals buy health insurance on a per-
fectly competitive market.
Under Disclosure Duty (DD hereafter), equilibrium contracts are such
that individuals pay an “average” premium if they do not test, but are faced
with a discrimination risk if they test, in the form of a lottery (low premium
if type L, high premium if type H). As for Consent Law (CL hereafter), in
light of the current low take-up rate of genetic tests (see Hoy et al., 2014), we
assume that insurers offer a pooling contract with full (exogenous) coverage to
all who pretend (truthfully or not) to be uninformed. At equilibrium, agents
show their test results to the insurers if they are revealed to be type L, and
pretend to be uninformed (i.e., not to have done the test) otherwise. The
equilibrium (zero profit) premium attached to the pooling contract reflects
the intensity of adverse selection at play (with a higher premium when more
type H individuals falsely pretend to be uninformed).
Solving the analytical model allows us to obtain three hypotheses that
4An important exception is studied in Miller and Tucker (2018), which we discuss at
the end of this section.
5The model we develop here applies more generally to any kind of type-revealing tests
(such as EKG, X-rays, HIV tests, IQ tests, etc.) that could be exploited by insurance
companies, provided that agents tested positive can take some action in order to decrease
their probability of damage. Genetic testing is an important leading example.
6See for instance Snyder (2016) for examples fitting our model, especially Figure 17 for
how taking a genetic test gives more precise information as to the probability of developing
several diseases, and page 76 for examples of prevention efforts for agents genetically more
susceptible to develop certain diseases.
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we then test with an experiment. First, test take-up rates decrease with the
test cost under both regulations, and are higher under CL than under DD
(since obtaining bad genetic news can be hidden from the insurer under CL).
Second, the test take-up rate under CL increases with the amount of adverse
selection (since agents test in order to escape the pooling contract, which
is made less attractive by the higher equilibrium premium necessitated by a
higher level of adverse selection). Third, agents prefer CL when the test cost
is low, and DD when the test cost is large.
We design an experiment in a neutral framework in which subjects have to
make several choices between a lottery and a sure payoff. The lottery (resp.,
the sure payoff) corresponds to the pay-off obtained when (resp., when not)
testing. We have opted for a neutrally-framed (rather than for a health-
framed) experiment because it is the most direct way to translate our model
into an experiment, but also because this allows us to control directly for the
heterogeneity in test costs (which, in our theoretical model, stands for both
the financial and psychological costs of the genetic tests). More precisely, the
payoffs offered to subjects correspond to the equilibrium contracts obtained
in the analytical part of the paper, when considering four different costs of
the genetic test, and five different intensities of adverse selection (for the CL
regulation).
Our experimental results match the main theoretical predictions, but also
allow us to go further and to shed light for instance on the intensity of the
trade-off between adverse selection and discrimination risk. We refer the
impatient reader to the concluding section for a more detailed summary
of the main results of the paper. We find evidence of both discrimination
risk and of adverse selection at equilibrium. Subjects seem very sensitive
to the discrimination risk, since most of them do not test under DD, even
when the test cost is low. Under Consent Law, take-up rates increase with
the adverse selection intensity. A decrease in the test cost, and in adverse
selection intensity, both make it more likely that Consent Law is preferred
to Disclosure Duty.
We now turn to the related literature, starting with the articles closest
to ours. Barigozzi and Henriet (2011) and Peter et al. (2017) compare DD
and CL (among other regulations). Their result (that DD dominates CL)
depends crucially on two simplifying assumptions that we are not making
here: that genetic tests are costless, and that individuals are homogenous in
their preference for information acquisition. These assumptions imply that
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all individuals test under CL at equilibrium. By contrast, we obtain in our
setting that not all individuals test under either CL or DD, because they
vary in their (financial, but especially psychological) cost of taking the test.
Hoel et al. (2006) study the consequences for the testing decisions of intro-
ducing heterogeneity in psychological preferences (repulsion from chance), in
a setting with separating equilibria, but do not compare the properties of
various regulations.7
Gemmo et al. (2017) develop a model where agents have access to a free
technology (such as telemonitoring) that reveals their type to the insurers.
This technology then plays a role similar to genetic testing in our consent
law environment. Their model differs from ours in several important ways.
First, they consider separating contracts. Second, all individuals are aware of
their risk type, and the technology is only used to reveal this type to insurers
(while in our setting agents who have not performed genetic tests are unaware
of their type). Third, agents differ in their utility cost of revealing their risk
type to the insurers (transparency aversion), so that low risk agents who are
sufficiently transparency averse will not reveal their type to the insurers, in
stark contrast with our setting.
Few articles assume that insurers offer a pooling contract, an assump-
tion much more in line with current practice than the separating contracts
a` la RS used by the rest of the literature. Hoy (2006) studies the equity-
efficiency trade-off of regulatory adverse selection based on a pooling equi-
librium. Bardey and De Donder (2019) analyzes which type of equilibrium
(pooling or separating) emerges as a function of the genetic test take-up rate
under Consent Law. A recent survey of the economic effects of risk classifica-
tion bans, including in settings where insurers provide pooling equilibria, is
provided by Dionne and Rothschild (2014). Other papers assuming pooling
contracts under CL are Hoy et al. (2003) and Crainich (2017), but they do
not compare regulations.8
Strohmenger and Wambach (2000) focus on health issues where the will-
ingness to pay for treatment is lower than the treatment’s cost. This simple
twist to the assumptions underlying standard insurance models is enough to
7Hoy et al. (2014) also depart from the traditional expected utility framework by
studying the impact of ambiguity aversion on the acquisition of genetic information, but
they do not consider heterogenous preferences.
8Furthermore, there is some recent interest in pooling equilibria, see Einav and Finkel-
stein (2011) for a general approach and Peter et al. (2016) for an application to guaranteed
renewability.
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generate strikingly different results. To start with, only agents with a low
probability of getting sick wish to buy an actuarially fair insurance contract.
Strohmenger and Wambach (2000) study the impact of genetic tests in two
settings: with symmetric information (corresponding to the “laissez-faire”
regulation allowing insurers to request genetic tests and use their results)
and with asymmetric information (a “strict prohibition” regulation prevent-
ing insurers from making use of test results). They show that, in the case of
symmetric information, genetic testing can enhance efficiency, in contrast to
standard models. They obtain the opposite result in the strict prohibition
setting, where the introduction of genetic testing can result in a complete
market failure where no one buys insurance anymore. Note that these re-
sults are obtained for a large set of equilibrium contracts (pooling with full or
partial coverage, separating with or without cross-subsidies across types).
All related articles mentioned so far are applied theory papers. Schudy
and Utikal (2018) is the only paper we are aware of studying an experiment
dealing with the acquisition and disclosure of personal health data in health
care markets, but this paper does not study the trade-off between adverse
selection and discrimination risk. Miller and Tucker (2018) studies how US
States genetic privacy laws affect the diffusion of personalized medicine, us-
ing data on genetic testing for cancer risks. They focus on three aspects of
the US regulations: the requirement of informed consent from tested indi-
vidual, restrictions to discriminatory usages of genetic data by employers,
health care providers or insurance companies, and limits to redisclosure of
genetic information without the consent of the individual. Their obtain that
“approaches to genetic and health privacy that give users control over redis-
closure encourage the spread of genetic testing” (p. 1), which is in line with
our result that agents test more under CL than under DD.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 develops the theoretical
model, including the set-up and the analysis of the two regulations. Section
3 presents our experimental setting. Section 4 presents our experimental
results. Section 5 concludes.
2 Analytical model and predictions
We develop a theoretical setting that allows us to formulate predictions to be
tested during the experiment. We first introduce our analytical set-up where
agents can take a genetic test allowing them to tailor their prevention effort.
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We then introduce two regulations of the health insurance market, Disclosure
Duty and Consent Law, and we finally compare the testing decisions and
utility levels of agents across the two regulations.
2.1 Set-Up
The economy is composed of a unitary mass of individuals. We focus on a
generic illness, for which agents have either a genetic background predisposing
them to develop the disease (bad type, or type H, with a high probability
of developing the illness) or a neutral/beneficial genetic background (good
type, or type L, with a low probability of developing the disease). There is
a fraction λ of type H in the population. Developing the disease is modeled
as the occurrence of a monetary damage, d.
Taking a genetic test is the only way for agents to know their type. The
test reveals with certainty their true type.9 Agents decide first to take the
genetic test or not. With a slight abuse of language, we call those who do
not take the test type U agents, as they remain uninformed about their type.
Learning about your genetic background has medical value. We assume
that a (costly) prevention effort decreases the probability of developing the
disease for type H agents, but has no effect for type L agents. We also
assume that the cost/benefit ratio of this effort is low enough that even
agents uninformed of their type find it worthwhile to exert this effort. One
reason to do the genetic test is then to forego the effort cost for agents
who learn that they are of type L.10 We make the important simplifying
assumption that the prevention effort is observable and contractible by the
insurers. This assumption seems reasonable, since there is little empirical
evidence of ex ante moral hazard in health insurance contracts (see Einav
and Finkelstein, 2018). We refer the reader to the concluding section for a
brief discussion of the consequences of this assumption.
We denote by pH the probability that a type H agent who exerts a pre-
9This simplification is often made in the economic literature on genetic testing: to the
best of our knowledge, Hoy et al. (2014) is the only paper allowing genetic testing to
generate errors of type I and II.
10Examples include all behavioral modifications that are not too costly (such as dietary
requirements or physical exercise for instance). Our results would not be qualitatively
affected if we were to assume that type U agents do not exert a prevention effort. Bardey
and De Donder (2013) study which case arises at equilibrium as a function of the effort
cost and impact on the probability of developing the disease when of type H.
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vention effort becomes sick, and by pL the probability that a low type agent
(who does not exert the prevention effort) develops the disease, with pH > pL.
The expected probability of developing the disease for an individual who does
not take the test (but exerts the prevention effort) is
pU = λpH + (1− λ)pL.
The monetary cost of the prevention effort is denoted by φ, and is the
same for all agents undertaking the effort. The (monetary equivalent of the)
cost of taking the genetic test is denoted by K. This cost includes the fi-
nancial cost of the test plus the monetary equivalent of the psychological
cost/disutility from knowing one’s genetic background.11 Agents differ ac-
cording to K, allowing for different (unmodelled) attitudes towards (genetic)
information acquisition. We denote by G(K) the cumulative distribution of
K.
The timing of decisions runs as follows. After having first decided whether
to test and then whether to undertake the prevention effort, agents buy health
insurance on the private market. The equilibrium contracts offered on the
market depend on the regulation of this market, to which we now turn.
2.2 Health insurance market regulations: Disclosure
Duty vs Consent Law
Throughout the paper, we study and contrast two well-known regulations of
health insurance markets: Disclosure Duty and Consent Law. Under DD,
agents are required to reveal to insurers the results of any genetic test they
have chosen to take. Under CL, agents choose to reveal or not to the insur-
ers whether they tested and the result of the genetic test. We study both
regulations in turn.
2.2.1 Disclosure Duty
Insurers and policyholders have the same information when contracting, and
know whether the agent has type L or H (if he has taken the test) or type U
11This monetary equivalent K allows us to keep the simple expected utility framework
and may capture different notions introduced in the literature, such as ambiguity aversion
(Epstein, 1999), repulsion to chance (Hoel et al., 2006) and psychological expected utility
(Caplin and Leahy [2001] and Barrigozi and Levaggi [2010]). We measure the cost K
in monetary terms because we want to control for the individuals’ value of K in the
experiment.
8
(if he has not taken the test). The insurance contract devised for an agent
of type j ∈ {L, H, U} is characterized by a premium in case of health, πj
and an indemnity (net of the premium) in case of sickness, Ij. Competition
induces profit-maximizing insurers to offer actuarially fair contracts with full
insurance, so that πj = pjd and Ij = (1 − pj)d.
12 All agents have the same
income y and the same preferences over consumption, which are represented
by a classical Bernoulli utility function v(.) (with v′(.) > 0 and v′′(.) < 0).
An uninformed policyholder’s expected utility is then
U0DD = (1− pU)v(y − πU − φ) + pUv(y − d+ IU − φ)
= v(y − pUd− φ),
where the superscript 0 over UDD stands for “no genetic testing”.
Individuals who take the genetic test obtain a utility level equal to
(1− pH)v(y−K−πH −φ)+ pHv(y−K− d+ IH −φ) = v(y− pHd−K−φ),
if they are revealed to be of type H, and of
(1− pL)v(y −K − πL) + pLv(y −K − d+ IL) = v(y − pLd−K),
if they are revealed to be of type L. Their expected utility when taking the
test is then given by
U1DD = λv(y − pHd−K − φ) + (1− λ) v(y − pLd−K),
where the superscript 1 over UDD stands for “taking the genetic test”.
Let us denote by ΨDD the informational value of the genetic test under
Disclosure Duty,
ΨDD = U
1
DD − U
0
DD (1)
= λv(y − pHd−K − φ) + (1− λ) v(y − pLd−K)− v(y − pUd− φ),
12As mentioned above, we assume that the prevention effort is observable by the insurers,
so that this effort is reflected in the equilibrium premium. As shown by Bardey and De
Donder (2013), the non-observability of the prevention effort by insurers would result in
contracts with partial coverage being offered to agents. Intuitively, agents need to have
enough “skin in the game” in order to be induced to make a prevention effort whose
result (a lower damage probability) is not observed by insurers. We adopt this assumption
for simplicity reasons, as it would have been most difficult to elicit endogenous partial
coverage rates in the experiment, and as our focus is rather on the adverse selection/ risk
discrimination trade-off betwen regulations.
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with agents doing the test if ΨDD > 0.
From (1), we see that the main drawback of DD is that it exposes agents
to a discrimination risk : rather than obtaining the sure payoff associated
with remaining uninformed, they face a lottery when taking the test. The
more risk averse agents are, the less likely they are to take the test, as they
suffer more from the discrimination risk. Agents may decide to take the test
even if K > 0, since taking the test allows them to save on the effort cost
φ when they are revealed to have a favorable genetic background. A larger
value of K (because, for instance, of a larger disutility from knowing one’s
own genetic background) renders genetic testing less attractive. We denote
by KDD the threshold value of K below (resp., above) which agents take
(resp., do not take) the genetic test under DD–i.e., the value of K such that
ΨDD = 0.
2.2.2 Consent Law
Under CL, agents have an incentive to hide any bad genetic information,
thereby creating adverse selection. The usual way to deal with adverse se-
lection, in the Rothschild and Stiglitz (1976)’s tradition, is to assume that
insurers offer separating contracts, with partial coverage (i.e., a deductible)
for the mimicked type (here, type U) in order to prevent the mimicking type
(here, type H) from taking the contract intended for the former. As pointed
out by Hoy et al. (2003), there is no recorded instance of contracts offering a
deductible in case the policyholder does not provide genetic tests results. We
then rather assume that the insurers offer a pooling contract intended for all
those who claim to be uninformed.13 We further assume that insurers offer a
pooling contract with an exogenous coverage level (as is the case in Switzer-
land14 and in the Netherlands for instance, where the regulator imposes the
coverage level), and for simplicity we consider full coverage.15
13There exist both experimental and theoretical arguments in favor of the emergence of
pooling (as opposed to separating) contracts: see for instance Posey and Yavas (2007) for
the former, and Wilson (1977), Allard et al. (1997) and Newhouse (1996) for the latter.
14Basic health insurance is mandatory with a 90% coverage rate (going to
100% above some expense threshold), but must be bought on the private mar-
ket. See https://lenews.ch/2015/10/08/15-things-you-should-know-about-swiss-health-
insurance/, last accessed on 5 November 2018.
15Alternatively, we could have used Wilson (1977)’s equilibrium concept, as in Crainich
(2017) and Hoy et al. (2003), where the equilibrium contract is either a pooling one
with partial coverage or the Rothschild and Stiglitz (1976) separating equilibrium. This
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Tested agents of type L reveal their type to the insurers to benefit from
a lower premium, while tested agents of type H claim to be uninformed to
benefit from the pooling contract. The premium charged for the pooling
contract reflects the composition of the pool. We assume that the pooling
contract clientele is made of a fraction f of truly uninformed agents (type U)
and of a fraction 1−f of cheating agents (tested agents of type H). Roughly
speaking, 1− f measures the intensity of the adverse selection at play, with
more adverse selection translating into a lower f .16 The utility of an agent
who does not test is then given by
U0CL = v(y − (fpU + (1− f)pH)d− φ),
while the expected utility of an agent who takes the genetic test is
U1CL = λv(y − (fpU + (1− f)pH) d−K − φ) + (1− λ)v(y − pLd−K).
We denote by ΨCL the informational value of genetic testing under CL,
given by
ΨCL = U
1
CL − U
0
CL
= λv(y − (fpU + (1− f)pH) d−K − φ) + (1− λ)v(y − pLd−K)
−v(y − (fpU + (1− f)pH) d− φ). (2)
Individuals who take the test obtain the same monetary payoff (minus
the test cost K) than if they did not when they are unlucky (type H) and a
better payoff if they are lucky (type L). It is then straightforward that they
do take the test when K = 0, and that the incentives to take the test are
reduced when K increases. We then denote by KCL the (positive) value of
K such that ΨCL = 0, and below (resp., above) which agents (resp., do not)
take the genetic test under Consent Law.
Increasing f (i.e., decreasing adverse selection in the pool) has two im-
pacts of opposite signs onKCL. On the one hand, a larger value of f improves
alternative setting would increase type U ’s utility and decrease type H’s utility, compared
to our setting, resulting in a lower fraction of agents who take the test under CL, and
who prefer CL to DD. Note that introducing endogenous coverage rate and endogenous
move from pooling to separating contract, a` la Wilson, would have been very difficult to
translate into an experimental setting, since we would have had to first elicit the most-
preferred coverage rate of uninformed subjects under CL, and whether they prefer this
contract to a separating contract, before moving to the comparison between CL and DD.
16See also Peter et al. (2016) for a similar reasoning applied to guaranteed renewability.
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the payoff associated to the pooling contract and thus reduces the amount to
be gained by testing. On the other hand, if K is large, the marginal utility
with the pooling contract is much higher if the agent has tested (and paid
K) than if he did not. The lower pooling premium generated by a larger
value of f then increases more U1CL than U
0
CL, thus increasing the incentive
to test.17
Lemma 1 KCL decreases with f if policyholders are not too risk averse (v(.)
is not too concave) and if λ is low enough.
Proof. Applying the implicit function theorem to (2), we obtain that:
dKCL
df
=
(pH − pU) d [λv
′(y − (fpU + (1− f)pH) d−K − φ)− v
′(y − (fpU + (1− f)pH) d− φ)]
λv′(y − (fpU + (1− f)pH) d−K − φ) + (1− λ)v′(y − pLd−K)
.
2.2.3 Comparisons between the two regulations
Figure 1 summarizes the payoff structure of the model we are studying. For
each regulation, agents first choose whether to test or not, and nature deter-
mines their test result. They then buy the insurance contracts computed in
the previous section, with the corresponding payoffs reported in the termi-
nal nodes of Figure 1. In this section, we compare the testing decisions and
utility levels across regulations.
Insert Figure 1 around here
We start by comparing utility levels across regulations, for given testing
decisions.
Lemma 2 U1CL ≥ U
1
DD and U
0
DD ≥ U
0
CL ∀K, f.
17This second effect occurs when an agent buys the pooling contract after having tested–
i.e., with probability λ.
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Proof. Immediate from the definitions of the four utility levels.
For individuals who choose to test under both regulations, CL is ex ante
(before the test reveals the agent’s type) preferable to DD, because they
obtain the same payoff under both regulations if they are revealed to be of
type L, while they fare better under CL, by being pooled with type U , if
they are revealed to be of type H. Conversely, for individuals who do not
test under either regulation, DD is preferable to CL because the pooling
contract offered under CL is more costly than the contract for uninformed
agents offered under DD.
The previous sections have defined the test cost threshold levels below
(resp., above) which agents take (resp., do not take) the test under each
regulation. The following lemma compares these two thresholds.
Lemma 3 KCL > KDD ∀f ∈ [0, 1] .
Proof. Follows from the facts that ΨCL = U
1
CL−U
0
CL > ΨDD = U
1
DD−U
0
DD
∀f,K by Lemma 2, and that both ΨCL and ΨDD are decreasing in K, ∀f,K.
Lemma 3 says that, everything else equal, policyholders are more willing
to take a genetic test under CL than under DD. This result is intuitive,
since individuals gain more by taking the test under CL than under DD
(ΨCL > ΨDD), both because testing does not expose them to a discrimination
risk under CL (since they obtain the same contract whether of type U or
type H) and because the contract offered in case the test is not taken is
more expensive under CL (because of adverse selection) than under DD.
The next proposition compares utility levels across regulations when agents
choose optimally whether they test or not in each regulation (i.e., it solves
the game tree depicted in Figure 1 by backward induction).
Proposition 1 All individuals with K low enough that they take the test
under both regulations (K < KDD < KCL) are better off under Consent Law.
All individuals with K large enough that they do not take the test under
either regulation (K > KCL > KDD) are better off under Disclosure Duty.
All individuals with intermediate values of K (KCL > K > KDD) take the
test only under Consent Law, and their utility difference between Disclosure
Duty and Consent Law increases with K and decreases with f .
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Proof. K < KDD implies that agents do the test under both regulations
(by Lemma 3) in which case they are better off under CL (by Lemma 2).
K > KCL implies that agents do not take the test under either regulation
(by Lemma 3) in which case they are better off under DD (by Lemma 2). In
the intermediate case where KDD < K < KCL, the difference in utility levels
between DD and CL is
U0DD − U
1
CL = v(y − pUd− φ)
− [λv(y − (fpU + (1− f)pH)d−K − φ) + (1− λ) v(y − pLd−K)] ,
which is increasing in K and decreasing in f .
Proposition 1 can be illustrated in Figure 2, which shows the utility dif-
ferential between DD (UDD) and CL (UCL), measured at the optimal testing
decision of agents in each regulation (so that UDD =max(U
0
DD, U
1
DD) and
UCL =max(U
0
CL, U
1
CL)), as a function of K, when f = 0, 0 < f < 1 and
f = 1. When f > 0 (so that some agents who buy the pooling contract
under CL are uninformed about their own type) and K < KDD, the utility
level under DD (U1DD) decreases faster than under CL (U
1
CL) because of the
larger marginal utility under the former (due to the larger premium when
revealed of type H). For f > 0 and intermediate values of K, the test cost
K is paid only under CL, so that the utility difference between DD an CL
(U0DD − U
1
CL) increases with K. When f = 0 (so that all agents claiming to
be uninformed under CL are of type H) and K > KDD, utility is strictly
larger under DD because individuals suffer from adverse selection under CL
(with a larger premium in the pooling contract for those who do not test).
Finally, we note for future reference that choosing to test under CL is a
necessary, but not sufficient, condition for preferring CL to DD in the game
depicted in Figure 1.
Insert Figure 2 around here
Solving our model reveals that the comparison of ex ante expected utilities
under CL and DD is ambiguous when agents test under CL but not under
DD and 0 < f < 1. We now move to the presentation of the design of our
experiment which will allow us, among other things, to shed light on this
comparison.
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3 Experimental Setting
In the first subsection, we prove that a simple contingent analysis consisting
of two binary questions suffices to determine (i) whether agents test or not
under each regulation and (ii) which of the two regulations they prefer. We
then present the experiment we have devised to implement this contingent
analysis. Finally, we formulate the three hypotheses we want to test using
our experiment.
3.1 Task fundamentals
Our objective in the experiment is to elicit the preferences within regulation
(i.e., whether to test or not) and between regulations (i.e., whether CL or
DD is preferred, when agents choose optimally whether to test or not for
each regulation separately). In other words, we aim at ranking with strict
inequalities the following utility comparisons: U1CL ≷ U
0
CL, U
1
DD ≷ U
0
DD and
UCL ≷ UDD. In terms of the tree diagram shown in Figure 1, we want to
elicit the subjects’ choices in each one of the three solid nodes.
Observe that both the choice of regulation and the choice of whether to
test under CL depend both on the test cost K and on the intensity of adverse
selection f , while the choice of whether to test under DD depends only on
K. Since we are interested in testing decisions and regulation choices for
several values of K and of f , it is important that we find a way to reduce
the number of questions asked to the subjects for each pair (K, f).
We solve this problem by using a contingent analysis where, for each pair
(K, f), we ask (at most) the following two questions.
• Q1: When faced with CL, does the subject prefer to test or not (i.e.,
how does the subject rank U1CL and U
0
CL)?
If the subject prefers not to test, no further questioning is required for
this pair (K, f). If the subject prefers to test (U1CL > U
0
CL), then we ask the
second question:
• Q2: Does the subject prefer to “test under CL” or “not to test under
DD” (i.e., how does the subject rank U1CL and U
0
DD)?
The following proposition shows that using this contingent analysis allows
us to answer the two questions we are interested in.
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Proposition 2 The contingent analysis described above and composed of
questions Q1 and Q2 asked for pairs (K, f) including f = 0 is sufficient
to determine the preferences within and between regulations of the subjects
for all pairs (K, f) studied.
Proof. If the answer to Q1 is that U0CL > U
1
CL, then using Lemma 2 allows
us to infer the full ranking of utility levels of the subject: U0DD > U
0
CL >
U1CL > U
1
DD.
If the answer to Q1 is that U0CL < U
1
CL, then we proceed to Q2. If the answer
to Q2 is that U0DD > U
1
CL, we know from Q1 and Q2 that U
0
DD > U
1
CL > U
0
CL
and from Q2 and Lemma 2 that U0DD > U
1
CL > U
1
DD. These two partials
ranking are sufficient to determine the preferences within regulations and
between regulations of the subject, even though we are not able to rank U0CL
and U1DD.
If the answer to Q2 is that U0DD < U
1
CL, we know from Q2 and Lemma 2 that
U1CL > U
0
DD > U
0
CL and that U
1
CL > U
1
DD. We then know that the subject
chooses to test under CL, and prefers CL to DD. In order to assess whether
the subject chooses to test under DD, we need to compare U0DD with U
1
DD.
Observe that U1DD = U
1
CL when f = 0. We then know how the subject ranks
U1DD and U
1
CL either from his answer to Q1 with f = 0 (when U
0
CL > U
1
CL
with f = 0 so that U0DD > U
1
DD) or to Q2 if U
0
CL < U
1
CL with f = 0.
The proof of Proposition 2 makes use of the two utility rankings in Lemma
2 and of the fact that the expected payoffs when testing are identical under
CL and DD when f = 0. Recall from Lemma 2 that agents most-prefer
either CL and to test, or DD and not to test. The proof of Proposition 2
establishes that subjects prefer CL to DD if and only if they prefer to test in
both Q1 and Q2. Alternatively, they prefer DD if they choose not to test in
Q1 or in Q2. When subjects prefer to test in Q1 and Q2, their choice in Q2
when f = 0 determines whether they wish to test under DD or not. Their
preference for testing or not under CL is of course obtained directly from
Q1.18
We now turn to how we have implemented Q1 and Q2.
18Our contingent analysis does not allow us to fully rank the four possible outcomes
when agents choose to test in Q1 but not to test in Q2. In that case, we can only infer
that U0
DD
> U1
CL
> U0
CL
and that U0
DD
> U1
DD
. We do not need the full ranking to be
able to assess the preferences for testing within each regulation, and the most-preferred
regulation.
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3.2 Experimental Design
The experiment has been administered on paper. Subjects have received a set
of stapled sheets with the instructions and the tasks (see Appendix A). On
each page were displayed five tasks in consecutive rows. Each task consisted
in answering Q1 and Q2, with K and f (and hence the subjects’ payoffs)
varying across tasks. We studied 4 different values of K and 5 values of f ,
for a total of 20 tasks. The tasks were applied on a within-subject basis, and
the subjects were asked to perform the same twenty tasks.19 Note that the
ordering of the tasks differed between participants. More precisely, for all
subjects, the value of K was held constant on each page, while the value of
f was monotonic among tasks. We randomized across the participants the
four possible orderings of tasks, corresponding to increasing and decreasing
values of K (between pages) and f (within pages).
Q1 and Q2 were labeled as subtask A and subtask B, respectively. Both
subtasks required that the subjects choose between the same lottery (cor-
responding to testing under CL) and a sure payoff (not testing under CL
for subtask A, not testing under DD for subtask B). Proposition 2 has es-
tablished that it is not necessary to ask the answer to subtask B when the
subject prefers the sure payoff in subtask A (intuitively, subtask B improves
the sure payoff compared to subtask A). We nevertheless chose to ask sub-
jects to answer subtask B whatever their answer to subtask A in order to
check the internal consistency of their answers (see section 4.1).
We have chosen a neutral framing because it permits to control for many
characteristics of the experiment, such as the severity of the illness (which is
common to all agents), the financial cost of the test, and the proportion of
subjects of high-risk type. It has also the advantage of helping to secure the
consistency between the multiple decisions elicited from the same participant.
The repeated use of a health framing might have differential effects between
19To have the closest fit with the model, subjects start the experiment with an endow-
ment/income y, and tasks correspond to losses to be subtracted from that endowment. In
all 20 tasks, the payoffs offered were computed from the following parameter values, with
monetary values in e: y = 36, d = 25.2, φ = 3.6, pH = 5/9, pL = 1/9 and λ = 1/2. The
20 tasks are obtained by crossing the 4 values of K ((2,4,6 and 8) corresponding to (y/18,
2y/18, 3y/18 and 4y/18)) with the 5 values of f (0,0.25,0.5,0.75 and 1). Some of these
parameters have more extreme values than in other insurance-motivated lab experiments
(e.g., in Riahi et al. (2013) where the wealth at risk ratio d/y is 0.2 and the high-risk
probability pH is 3/10). Given the small values of φ and K, this is necessary to induce
meaningful variations across choices within a task.
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participants (for instance, according to their medical background) that would
not have been observed by the researchers.
We now explain how we have implemented the lotteries in the experiment.
At the beginning of the experiment, subjects were given at random a sealed
envelope, and were told that one half of the envelopes distributed contained
a green card, and the other half a red one. A green (resp., red) card was
the equivalent to being of type L (resp., H) in our model, with λ = 1/2.
Choices in both subtasks were framed as opening or not opening the envelope,
corresponding to taking the test (and resolving the uncertainty as to one’s
type) or not. Participants were instructed to keep the envelope sealed until
the payment stage.20
After having performed the twenty tasks, participants were also asked
to answer an additional question in order to elicit their risk preferences us-
ing the procedure described in Eckel and Grossman (2008). Each subject
had to choose one among six lotteries that were increasing in both expected
value and variance. The risk elicitation procedure was framed as an extra
task to decrease the protocol’s complexity. The activity ended with a post-
experimental survey aimed to measure the tolerance to ambiguity using a
standardized and non-incentivized psychological test (Budner, 1962). The
Budner test on ambiguity aversion includes sixteen items, all of them using
a 7-point Likert scale. The ambiguity aversion score was computed accord-
ing to Budner (1962)’s instructions: score reversing the indicated items, and
then summing up all 16 items. The items from this test are reported in Ap-
pendix B. The post-experimental survey includes a final question to measure
willingness to take risks in a more general domain. The question, which also
uses a 7-point Likert scale and is adapted from Dohmen et al. (2011), says
“I see myself as a person who is fully prepared to take risks, who rarely tries
to avoid taking risks.”
We now turn to the payment protocol. In order to preserve incentive
compatibility (i.e., to avoid portfolio strategies), participants were told from
the outset that they would be paid according to one of the twenty one tasks
they were asked to perform. Following Cox et al. (2015), participants were
shown in advance all the tasks before any decision was made. Each partici-
20We have framed the discovery (or not) of one’s type as opening (or not) an envelope
to bring to the decision problem a different notion of risk (i.e., not knowing / not wanting
to know what is inside the envelope). This framing’s objective is to capture some psycho-
logical costs (or benefits) that are closer to the psychological costs of taking a genetic test
than to its financial costs, helping the external validity of our experimental results.
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pant was paid according to a different task number (1 to 21) and a different
subtask (A or B, for the first 20 tasks).21 Participants were allowed to open
their envelope (and discover the color of the paper inside) only in the fol-
lowing two cases. The first case arises if they selected the lottery (described
as “open the envelope”) in the task (between 1 and 20) and subtask (A or
B) chosen at random to be the basis of their payment. The second case oc-
curs if they were paid according to task 21 (in which case the green and red
cards were associated to the positive and negative outcomes of the lottery,
respectively).22
Two sessions were conducted at the Toulouse School of Economics in
December 2015 and February 2016. We had 33 participants in the first session
and 34 participants in the second session. To minimize selection issues, both
sessions were conducted during lecturing hours on two different courses from
the Master in Economics (the first session in the elective “Behavioral and
Experimental Economics” course and the second session in the mandatory
“Microeconomics” course). Subjects were not informed in advance about
the conduct of the experiment. Participants were, on average, 22 years old
(standard deviation of 1.47). Sixty percent of them were male. We observe
substantial variation in the ambiguity aversion score (the mean is 54.7, the
standard deviation is 7.44, and the maximum and minimum achievable scores
are 7 and 112) and in the non-incentivized risk aversion question (mean of
3.88, standard deviation of 1.39 in a 7-point Likert scale). Besides, the non-
21The front of the envelope containing the colored paper exhibited a letter from A to
U, with half of the envelopes showing a blue letter and the other half a black letter.
Subjects were told from the outset that we would reveal at the end of the activity the
bijections (i) between the letter printed on the envelope and the task number on which
their payment would be based, and (ii) between the color of the letter and the subtask on
which the payment would be based (except for task 21 for which this latter information
was irrelevant). Each subject was paid according to a different combination of (K, f),
corresponding to its unique letter. The color in which this unique letter was printed, blue
or black, defined whether they were paid according to subtask A or B.
22With this particular feature we block anticipated regret. Suppose we allowed subjects
to open the envelope, regardless of the experimental outcome, once the payment was made.
A subject of type L would have felt regrets in case he chose not to test. We did not allow
subjects to open their envelopes, unless the experimental outcome told them to do so, to
prevent subjects from considering the hypothetical scenario described above. The use of
envelopes with green and red cards representing L and H types, respectively, brings closer
the experimental setting to the revelation of the type in a more realistic setting, compared
to a die roll or a coin toss. This feature contributes to the “ecological validity” (Morton
and Williams, 2010) of our design.
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incentivized risk aversion question is positively correlated with the chosen
lottery in task 21 (Pearson’s ρ =0.33, p-value = 0.007). This evidence of
consistency of risk preference across domains speaks well to the external
validity of our experiment.23 The activity lasted 45-50 minutes. The average
earnings for the activity were 23 euros.
3.3 Experimental hypotheses
Our main objective in this article is to shed light first on the decisions by
agents to take a genetic test or not for a given regulation (CL or DD), and
then on their preferences for these regulations, given their testing decision
under each regulation. More formally, we now describe the three hypotheses
we want to test. These hypotheses, summarized in Table 1, are informed by
our analytical results (Lemmas 1 to 3 and Proposition 1 above).24
Table 1: Summary of hypotheses to be tested
Hypothesis Derived from What do we test? Description
H1(a) Lemma 3 KCL > KDD ∀f ∈ [0, 1] Higher test take-up rates under
CL than under DD.
H1(b) Equations
(1) and (2)
∂ΨDD
∂K
< 0, and
∂ΨCL
∂K
< 0 Take-up rates decrease with K for
CL and DD.
H2(a) Lemma 1
∂ΨCL
∂f
< 0 Take-up rates decrease with f
under CL.
H2(b) Lemma 1
∣
∣
∣
∂ΨCL
∂f
∣
∣
∣ smaller for more risk averse agents For large K, the effect of f on the
probability of testing under CL is
smaller for risk averse subjects.
H3 Proposition 2 UCL > UDD if K low, and
UCL < UDD if K large
CL is preferred to DD for low K.
DD is preferred to CL for high K.
Starting with the within-regulation decisions, we formulate the following
hypothesis.
Hypothesis 1 (a) Test take-up rates are higher under CL than under DD
for any value of the parameters (K, f). (b) Take-up rates decrease with test
cost K both for CL and for DD.
23Similarly, Dohmen et al. (2011) write that their “results suggest that risk attitudes
are strongly but not perfectly correlated across contexts.”
24We show in section 4.1 that the number of inconsistent choices made by subjects is
very low. We are thus confident that subjects have well understood the experiment, and
that we can base the hypotheses to be tested on the theoretical results obtained above.
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Part (a) of Hypothesis 1 derives from Lemma 3. Part (b) is straightfor-
ward from the definitions of the information value of genetic tests (see (1)
and (2)).
The next hypothesis concentrates on the testing decisions under CL, and
on how they are affected by the value of f and by the preferences of the
agents.
Hypothesis 2 (a) Take-up rates under CL are decreasing with f (i.e., in-
creasing with the intensity of adverse selection). (b) For a large test cost
K, the marginal effect of f on the probability of testing under CL is smaller
(i.e., less negative) for risk averse subjects (with respect to more risk tolerant
subjects).
Part (a) constitutes a test of whether the conditions under which KCL
decreases with f (see Lemma 1) are satisfied in the experiment. Part (b)
further builds on Lemma 1, and looks at how risk aversion affects the impact
of adverse selection (as measured by 1−f) on the probability of testing when
K is large (so that the marginal utility with the pooling contract is much
higher if the agent has tested than if he has not, reducing the incentive to
take the test when f is increased).
Moving now to the between-regulation decision, the following hypothesis
is obtained from Proposition 1:
Hypothesis 3 CL is preferred to DD for low levels of K. DD is preferred
to CL for high levels of K.
Section 4 tests these three hypotheses using all twenty exogenous pairs
(K, f) studied in the experiment.
4 Results from the experiment
We start by showing in the first subsection that the number of inconsistent
choices across tasks and subtasks is very low. This result gives us confidence
that the subjects have well understood the protocol,25 so we proceed to the
second subsection, where we study the testing decisions of the subjects. In
the last subsection we analyze their preferences over regulations.
25For instance, they seem to have well understood that the subtasks were framed as
losses to be subtracted from the endowment of e36.
21
4.1 Inconsistent choices
We perform two exercises to detect inconsistent choices made by subjects.
First, we perform a within-task comparison. Remember from section 3.1
that, for any given (K, f) with f < 1, agents who prefer the sure payoff in
subtask A (so that U0CL > U
1
CL) should also prefer the sure payoff in subtask
B (so that U0DD > U
1
CL) since both subtasks differ only in the sure payoff
amount, which is larger in subtask B than in subtask A (with U0DD > U
0
CL).
Hence, we tag a choice as inconsistent when, for any of the four values of
K, any of the subjects choose not to test in Q1 and then to test in Q2.
Out of 268 cases (4 values of K times 67 subjects), we found 3 within-task
(1.1%) inconsistencies.26 We use a Mann-Whitney test to confirm that these
differences are not associated to particular sessions, and neither to the use of
decreasing or increasing values of f orK in the way that tasks were presented
(p-values are 0.2675, 0.315 and 0.188, respectively).27
Second, we perform a between-task comparison. A simple inspection
of the protocol in Appendix A shows that, for K constant (same question
sheet), moving down the list of tasks improves the worst payoff among the
two offered in subtask B’s lottery, but keeps the other payoffs in this subtask
unaffected. Hence, we tag a choice as inconsistent when the subject tests
in Subtask B for a given task number, and does not test for a larger (resp.
smaller) task number, associated to a larger (resp. larger) f , where the
worst outcome from testing improved (resp. decreased). Out of 268 cases,
we found 9 between-task (3.4%) inconsistencies. Mann-Whitney tests reveal
that inconsistencies are not systematically associated to a session, and neither
to the use of decreasing or increasing values of K (p-values are 0.769 and
0.119, respectively). However, inconsistencies across tasks are more likely to
appear when f decreases from one task to the next within the same sheet
(p-value 0.012).
In the light of the low proportion inconsistencies, we feel confident that
subjects have well understood the experiment protocol, and we move to the
26Note that the frequency of inconsistencies would be even lower if we were to take the
unit of observation to be the task when f < 1, in which case we only have 4 inconsistencies
out of 4 (values of K) times 4 (values of f < 1) times 67 (subjects) = 1072 observations.
27We also obtain 8 cases out of the 268 answers to tasks involving f = 1 where subjects
make different choices in subtasks A and B, even though the payoffs are the same in
both subtasks. Different choices may not correspond to inconsistencies, but rather to
indifference between the two payoffs, since we do not allow subjects to register indifferences
in the experiment. So we obtain at most 3% of inconsistencies of that type.
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study of its results, starting with the testing decisions.
4.2 Testing decisions within regulations
Figure 3 reports the observed test take-up rates within CL and DD for the
different levels ofK and f considered in our experiment. We first observe that
take-up rates are higher under CL than under DD, as predicted in Hypothesis
1 (a). Actually, the take-up rates under DD are very small (varying from
7.5% for the lowest value of K, to 0 for its two highest values). This means
that subjects are very sensitive to the discrimination risk associated with
this regulation. By contrast, take-up rates under CL are very close to 100%,
for any value of f , when K is low. This is intuitive since section 2.2.2 has
shown that take-up would be 100% with K = 0, and thus would remain by
continuity close to 100% for K small. We then observe that take-up rates
decrease with the cost of the test under both regulations, in accordance with
Hypothesis 1 (b).
We now study more closely the testing decisions under CL. Figure 3 shows
that take-up rates under CL are decreasing with f, confirming Hypothesis 2
(a).28 Recall from Lemma 1 that increasing f improves the pooling contract
offered to agents (pretending to be) uninformed, which has two effects of
opposite signs on the incentives to take the test. On the one hand, a better
pool decreases incentives to test since agents test in order to move away
from this pooling contract. On the other hand, if utilities are very concave,
marginal utility is especially large when agents take the test (and pay its
cost), and the lower premium associated to a larger f especially benefits
those who take the test, inducing more agents to do so. Figure 3 shows that
the former effect is larger than the latter.
Insert Figure 3 here
Hypothesis 2 (b) claims that the least risk averse participants should be
more sensitive to changes in f in their testing decision under CL. We compute
a probit model for Q1 to examine this hypothesis, paying special attention to
28The only exception in Figure 3 seems to be the increase in take-up rate for K = y/9
when moving from f = 3/4 to f = 1, but both a chi-squared test (p-value 0.71) and a
t-test (same p-value) show that the difference in take-up rates between those two points
is not significant.
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the heterogeneous effects of subjects’ risk aversion. We measure risk aversion
by asking participants to choose one from the six lotteries shown in Task 21
in Appendix A. The lotteries are ordered by increasing expected payoff going
hand in hand with increasing variance. Less risk averse agents then should
choose a lottery with both a higher expected payoff and a higher variance.
For the computation of the probit model we classify as “least risk averse”
the respondents who have chosen one of the two least risky lotteries (43% of
respondents), and as “most risk averse” those respondents who have chosen
one of the two most risky lotteries (27% of respondents).
Figure 4 shows the predicted marginal effects for different values of f ,
ranging from 0 to 1, for the “least risk averse” (hollow diamonds) and “most
risk averse” (circles with dashed line) participants, separately, for the largest
value of K (= 2y/9). The initial difference in the marginal effects on the
probability of testing between risk aversion types is about 50 percentage
points for f = 0 (i.e., maximum adverse selection). This difference vanishes
as f gets closer to one (i.e., no adverse selection). This supports Hypothesis
2 (b).
Insert Figure 4 here
4.3 Preferences over regulations
We now move to the preferences over regulations. The left panel of Figure
5 displays the observed preferences for CL over DD as a function of the cost
of the test (K) and of the intensity of adverse selection (f). Recall from
Proposition 3 that, given the sequence of the choices presented in Figure 1,
if agents most prefer DD they also prefer not to test, and that if they most
prefer CL, they then prefer to test. Also, agents prefer CL to DD if they
choose to test in both Q1 and Q2, and DD otherwise.
We obtain that the proportion of subjects preferring CL to DD decreases
with K, for any given value of f . This is intuitive, since a larger value
of K discourages testing, and since CL is preferred to DD only when it is
optimal to test under CL. When K is large, most subjects prefer DD to CL,
in accordance with Hypothesis 3.
For K sufficiently low, y/18 and y/9 in our experiment, where y is the
endowment of the subject when the experiment starts, the proportion of sub-
jects preferring CL increases when the intensity of adverse selection decreases
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(i.e., when the proportion f of truly uninformed agents increases). This is
intuitive, since a larger value of f makes the pooling contract under CL more
attractive. Recall from Figure 3 that, for low values of K, the test take-up
rate under CL remains large for all values of f .
For higher levels of K, y/6 and 2y/9, the preferences between regulations
are less affected by the intensity of adverse selection, even though Figure 3
shows that the test take-up rate under CL decreases rapidly as f increases.
Recall the observation made after Proposition 1 that taking the test under
CL is a necessary, but not sufficient, condition to prefer CL over DD. One
can then infer that many of those subjects who change their decision to
not testing under CL as f increases already preferred DD to CL anyhow.
Observe that, for high levels of K, the amount of adverse selection needs to
be minimal (f close to 1) for some subjects to prefer CL over DD (7.5% for
K = y/6 and 4.5% for K = 2y/9). Figure 3 shows that most agents do not
take the test under CL for these parameter values.
Insert Figure 5 around here
We complement this analysis by jointly estimating the testing decisions
in subtasks A and B. We employ a bivariate probit regression to model the
two binary choices as dependent from each other.29 As is explained in Propo-
sition 2, choosing to test under Subtask A (Q1) corresponds to choosing to
test under CL, while choosing to test under Subtask B (Q2) corresponds to
preferring CL to DD. We show in section 3.1 that these testing decisions are
expected to be positively correlated because, conditional on not testing in
Subtask A, it is rational to not test in Subtask B: the sure payoff associated
to not testing is higher in Subtask A than in Subtask B, while both subtasks
offer the same lottery. An additional implication is that subjects testing in
Q2 also test in Q1. The choices in Q1 and Q2 are expected to be different
only for those willing to test within CL but prefer (not to test under) the DD
regulation (in which case they prefer the lottery in Q1, and the sure payoff
in Q2).
We report the results from the bivariate probit in Table 2. The table
includes, for all the listed variables, the coefficients corresponding to changes
29See Appendix C for more details on how the bivariate probit captures the relationship
between testing decisions.
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in the random utility model describing the testing decisions in Q1 and Q2.
For the main variables of interest, f and K, we also report their marginal
effects on the probabilities of testing in Q1 and Q2 (see coefficients in bold
and in brackets, and their standard errors in brackets). Marginal effects allow
us to assess how the intensity of adverse selection, captured by f , and the
cost of the test as a proportion of income, K, affect the probability of testing
in each task.30
We start with the sparsest specification in model (1), in which the only
covariates are f and K. Model (2) adds as covariates some participants’
characteristics (risk aversion, ambiguity aversion and gender), in addition
to categorical variables to control for order effects and session fixed effects.
Model (3) adds an interaction between the cost of the test K and our mea-
sures of risk aversion and ambiguity aversion. Model (4) adds participants’
fixed effects (at the expense of dropping participants’ characteristics that are
time invariant).
Model (1) shows that increasing the value of f by 0.1 (i.e., a decrease
of 10 percentage points in the intensity of adverse selection) decreases the
probability of testing in Q1 (i.e., testing under CL) by 5.7 percentage points,
and increases the probability of testing in Q2 (i.e., preferring CL to DD)
by 2.6 percentage points. Regarding K, the marginal effects are large and
highly non-linear, so we list the effects for every increase in K that occurred
in our experimental setting. Computations following model (1) reveal that
increasing K from e2 to e4 decreases the probability of testing in Q1 and
Q2 by 17.4 and 36.4 percentage points, respectively; increasing K from e4
to e6 decreases the probability of testing in Q1 and Q2 by 39.7 and 12.6
percentage points, respectively; and increasing K from e6 to e8 decreases
the probability of testing in Q1 and Q2 by 31.1 and 1.48 percentage points,
respectively.
The negative, and large, effect that an increase inK has on the probability
of testing under CL provides additional evidence supporting Hypothesis 1
30We do not report the marginal probabilities for the other covariates listed in Table 2
because the coefficients capturing the associated changes in the random utility model are
small, and therefore the computed marginal effects are statistically not different from zero
for risk aversion, ambiguity aversion and gender. Besides, marginal effects for f and K are
computed at the mean of the other covariates, and therefore it is not straightforward to
obtain the marginal effects for the interaction terms in model (3). Additional computations
of such heterogeneous effects do not exhibit differences in the effect ofK between low versus
high levels of risk aversion or ambiguity aversion.
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(b). Similarly, the negative effect of K on the probability of testing in Q2
supports Hypothesis 3, since a larger cost of the test increases the probability
of preferring DD over CL. Also, the negative effect of f on the probability of
testing under CL provides additional evidence in favor of Hypothesis 2 (a).
Results from models (2) and (3) show that the marginal effects are ro-
bust to the addition of participants’ characteristics, session and order fixed
effects. As for model (3), the coefficients for the added interaction terms
reveal the absence of heterogeneous effects of the cost of the test driven by
preferences for (financial) risk or by ambiguity. Unreported heterogeneous
marginal effects are also not significant.
The most noticeable differences in the computed marginal effects emerge
in model (4). However, these differences are partly a consequence of how
marginal effects are computed. Usually, marginal effects are computed as-
suming the mean value of covariates. This is not possible in model (4), since
we have 66 dichotomous variables that capture participants’ fixed effects.31
Hence, we compute the marginal effects for each participant and report in
Table 2 the average marginal effect of f and K on the probability of testing
in Q1 and Q2.
We obtain that the magnitudes of the marginal effects in model (4) are
smaller for Q1 and larger for Q2, compared with models (1) to (3). After
taking account of the within-subject variation in testing decisions between
tasks, the probability of testing under CL (measured with Q1) is less sensitive
to the values of f and K; whereas the probability of preferring CL to DD is
more sensitive to the values of f and K.
Going back to Figure 5, the right panel displays the predicted preferences
for CL over DD, corresponding to the marginal effects of the probit regres-
sion estimating the probability of testing for each value of f and K in the
experiment, instead of assuming a linear or quadratic relationship for each
parameter. The comparison of the two panels of Figure 5 shows that our
probit regression makes a good job at fitting the experimental data.
Both the good fit and the highly significant coefficients in Table 2 make
us confident that we can build on these regression results to shed additional
light on the subjects’ preferences. In Figure 6, we report the probability of
testing under CL (left panel) and of preferring CL to DD (right panel), as a
function ofK and f , obtained from the probit regression coefficients in model
31We have in total 67 participants, but one of them chose to not test in the two subtasks
for all 20 tasks.
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(2) of Table 2. In line with our theoretical analysis, we find that a decrease
in the test cost K makes it more likely that CL be preferred to DD, and
that subjects take the test within CL. Less adverse selection in the pooling
contract under CL (i.e., a higher f) makes CL more likely to be preferred to
DD, but decreases the test take-up rate under CL.
Insert Figure 6 around here
Figure 6 also shows that the sensitivity of the testing decision to adverse
selection depends non-linearly on the value of K. When the cost of the test is
high (resp. low), this sensitivity to adverse selection is small, due to the low
(resp. high) probability of testing estimated with the bivariate probit. For
intermediate values the bivariate probit model is more sensitive to adverse
selection.
5 Conclusion
Our main results from the experiment run as follows. We have spotted very
few inconsistencies in the subjects answers, and we thus feel confident that
they have well understood the experiment’s protocol. We obtain that test
take-up rates decrease with the genetic test cost under both regulations, and
that they are larger under CL than under DD. This result is intuitive and due
to the lack of discrimination risk under CL, unlike under DD. The test take-
up rate is very small under DD, even when the test cost is small: this shows
that subjects in the experiment are extremely sensitive to the discrimination
risk embedded in the DD regulation. The test take-up rate increases with
the amount of adverse selection in the pooling contract under CL (since more
agents try to escape this more expensive contract by obtaining the cheaper
contract associated with good genetic information), although the impact of
adverse selection is smaller for the more risk averse agents.
As for the preference for regulations (when individuals choose optimally
whether to test or not, under each regulation), the support for CL over DD
increases when the genetic test cost decreases. Recall that agents fare better
under DD than under CL if they choose (in both cases) not to test, because
the (pooling) contract under CL is costlier due to the presence of adverse
selection. Preferring to test under CL is thus a prerequisite to favor CL over
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DD, and a lower test cost (inducing more testing, especially under CL) then
increases the fraction of agents who prefer CL (and test) to DD. A lower
adverse selection intensity increases the support for CL over DD.
We obtain that less than one half of agents prefer CL to DD, whatever
the value of the test cost K. This equilibrium with DD and very little testing
seems pretty bleak from a normative perspective, as it is impossible to reap
the benefits from personalized medicine when genetic testing is shunned by
the public.
Which policy recommendations can we draw from these results? Author-
ities bent on favoring the emergence of personalized medicine should prefer
CL to DD, as the genetic test take-up rate is larger under the former than
under the latter. But this preference may not be shared by a majority of the
electorate, as we show above. The Laissez-Faire regulation would probably
make policyholders worse off than under DD in our framework, since it allows
insurers to demand from agents that they perform the genetic tests, while
very few agents voluntarily test under DD even when the test cost is low.
Our results of course have to be taken with caution. We have chosen
to run an experiment with neutral framing and with simple choices, mainly
to be able to remain as close as possible to the analytical model developed,
and to be able to better control all relevant aspects of the experiment and
to help secure the consistency of the respondents’ answers. The reality is
of course more complex, has higher stakes and relates to health decisions.
We thus take our results as indicative of what could happen in the realm of
personalized medicine within the next decade.
We would like to come back to two important assumptions made in the
analytical model. First, our results are based on the simplifying assumption
of a pooling contract with full coverage under CL. As we explain in footnote
15, this assumption biases our results in the direction of a larger fraction of
agents testing under CL, and preferring CL to DD, than with Wilson (1977)’s
approach resulting in endogenous partial coverage. This is an important
reminder that our results depend crucially on the type of equilibrium contract
offered in both regulations.
Second, we have assumed that the prevention effort (which is the source
of the health benefit generated by genetic tests) is observable by the insurers,
and that agents perform this effort if and only if it is efficient. Relaxing either
assumption would likely modify our experimental results. Unobservable pre-
vention would induce insurers to offer contracts with partial coverage rates,
to control for the ex ante moral hazard problem. Allowing agents in the ex-
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periment to choose whether they want to exert this prevention effort would
probably have generated a different pattern of prevention, which would have
affected their pay-offs. For instance, if agents procrastinate when consider-
ing the prevention effort, then a test which makes this effort non necessary
(when revealed to have a good genetic background) has higher value than in
our setting, potentially leading to larger take-up rates.
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Appendix A: The protocol
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IFIK 
PART TWO: TASK 21 
 
In the 21st and last task, you will be asked to choose one among six different lotteries. As for the first twenty (20) tasks, 
the GREEN and the RED colored papers indicate your payoff deduction in euros from the selected lottery, with the 
GREEN paper always giving a smaller payoff deduction than the RED paper.  
 
Example: 
 
 
 
You then have a total of TWENTY ONE tasks to perform: TWENTY tasks where you indicate whether you would prefer to 
OPEN or NOT TO OPEN the envelope, plus one final task where you SELECT THE LOTTERY you prefer. 
 
 
HOW DO YOU GET PAID? 
 
Please do not open the envelope until you are instructed to, at the payment stage, or we won’t be able to pay you. 
 
You will be paid the amount you have chosen in ONLY ONE of the 21 tasks according to the following procedure. 
 
There is a letter, from A to U, on the outside of the envelope. This letter differs across envelopes. Each letter is randomly 
matched with a task number. After we have collected the filled forms, we will reveal the correspondence between letter 
and task number.  
 
If the letter on your individual envelope corresponds to task 21, you will be paid according to the lottery you have 
chosen: you will open the envelope and get 36€ minus the lower payoff deduction if there is a GREEN paper slip in the 
envelope, and 36€ minus the larger payoff deduction if there is a RED paper slip. 
 
If the letter on your individual envelope corresponds to a task between 1 and 20, we will toss a coin to determine 
whether you will be paid according to subtask A or to subtask B. If, for the subtask determined by the toss outcome, you 
have indicated that you prefer NOT TO OPEN the envelope, the corresponding amount will be deducted from your 
endowment of 36€. If you have indicated that you prefer to OPEN the envelope, you will be asked to open it and you will 
get 36€ minus the smaller payoff deduction if there is a GREEN paper slip in the envelope, and 36€ minus the larger 
payoff deduction if there is a RED paper slip. 
 
Finally, we will ask you to fill a questionnaire. The collected information will be treated anonymously and will be used 
only with scientific purposes. Once you fill the questionnaire, please remain seated and silent until this form is collected.  
 
If you have any question, please raise your hand and we will respond individually.  
 
If all the instructions are clear and you agree to take part in this activity please sign the accompanying informed consent 
form. We also ask you to fill the accompanying receipt with your name, we will ask you to sign it when we pay you.  
 
Thank you for your participation! 
 
PLEASE DO NOT TURN THE PAGE UNTIL YOU ARE INSTRUCTED TO DO IT 
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Appendix B: Questionnaire for measuring am-
biguity aversion
Each one of the following sixteen statements was evaluated by the partici-
pants using a Likert scale from 7 (strongly agree with the statement) to 1
(strongly disagree with the statement). To compute the ambiguity aversion
score, odd-numbered items must be summed directly and even-numbered
items must be reverse-scored (a “7” scores 1, a “6” scores 2, and so on).
Items can be divided into three categories of ambiguity aversion: aversion to
novelty (N), aversion to complexity (C), and insolubility (I). The category is
listed as a superscript next to the item number.
1(I). An expert who doesn’t come up with a definite answer probably
doesn’t know too much.
2(N). I would like to take a free genetic test informing me of my probability
of developing cancer later in life.
3(I). There is really no such thing as a problem that can’t be solved.
4(C). People who fit their lives to a schedule probably miss most of the
joy of living.
5(C). A good job is one where what is to be done and how it is to be done
are always clear.
6(C). It is more fun to tackle a complicated problem than to solve a simple
one.
7(C). In the long run it is possible to get more done by tackling small,
simple problems rather than large and complicated ones.
8(C). Often the most interesting and stimulating people are those who
don’t mind being different and original.
9(N). What we are used to is always preferable to what is unfamiliar.
10(C). People who insist upon a yes or no answer just don’t know how
complicated things really are.
11(N). A person who leads an even, regular life in which few surprises or
unexpected happenings arise really has a lot to be grateful for.
12(I). Many of our most important decisions are based upon insufficient
information.
13(N). I like parties where I know most of the people more than ones
where all or most of the people are complete strangers.
14(C). Teachers or supervisors who hand out vague assignments give one
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a chance to show initiative and originality.
15(C). The sooner we all acquire similar values and ideals the better.
16(C). A good teacher is one who makes you wonder about your way of
looking at things.
Appendix C: The bivariate probit regression
describing choices in Q1 and Q2
The choices we observe in the experiment can be defined as
Q1 =
{
1 (test) if V1 ≥ 0
0 (no test) otherwise
, Q2 =
{
1 (test) if V2 ≥ 0
0 (no test) otherwise
with the underlying latent variables V1 and V2 given by
V1 = β
′
1
X + ǫ1,
V2 = β
′
2
X + ǫ2,
where X is the set of covariates reported in Table 2. The error terms from
the random utility equations, ǫ1 and ǫ2, are assumed to be jointly normally
distributed. That is, (
ǫ1
ǫ2
)
∼ N
[(
0
0
)
,
(
1 ρ
ρ 1
)]
.
As explained in section 4.3., the testing decisions in Q1 and Q2 are ex-
pected to be positively correlated (i.e., ρ > 0) given the contingent character
of our analysis.
Since we have repeated observations for each participant the standard
errors of the model are clustered at the individual level. The estimated
coefficients for all the covariates, as well as the marginal effects for f and K,
are shown in Table 2. An inspection of the two panels in Figure 5 shows that
the observed and predicted behavior are qualitatively similar.
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Figures
Figure 1: Payoff structure of the model.
Regulation
y − (fpU + (1− f)pH)) d− φ
No Test
Nature
y − (fpU + (1− f)pH)) d− φ−K
H
y − pLd−K
L
Test
Consent Law
y − pUd− φ
No Test
Nature
y − pHd− φ−K
H
y − pLd−K
L
Test
Disclosure Duty
Terminal nodes are represented by hollow circles, while nodes with solid circles are used
when a choice has to be made by society (first stage) or individuals (second stage).
Figure 2: Utility differences between Disclosure Duty and Consent Law,
measured at the optimal testing decision of agents in each regulation.
Figure 3: Observed test take-up rate within Consent Law (CL) and Disclo-
sure Duty (DD).
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Figure 4: Marginal effects for testing under CL between risk aversion cate-
gories for the largest test cost (K = 2y/9)
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Figure 5: Observed and predicted preferences between regulations.
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Figure 6: Predicted probabilities between and within genetic testing regula-
tions.
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